Second Treatise of Government Quotes by John Locke
The Enlightenment: John Locke
John Locke 29 August — 28 October was an influential English philosopher and social contract theorist. He developed an alternative to the Hobbesian state of nature and asserted a government could be good only if it received the consent of the governed and protected the natural rights of life , liberty , and estate. If such a consent was not achieved, Locke argued in favour of a right of rebellion, which he referred to as an "appeal to heaven". Misattributed [ edit ] That which is static and repetitive is boring. That which is dynamic and random is confusing. In between lies art.
Natural and legal rights are two types of rights. Natural rights are those that are not dependent on the laws or customs of any particular culture or government, and so are universal and inalienable they cannot be repealed by human laws, though one can forfeit their enforcement through one's actions, such as by violating someone else's rights. Legal rights are those bestowed onto a person by a given legal system they can be modified, repealed, and restrained by human laws. The concept of natural law is related to the concept of natural rights. Natural law first appeared in ancient Greek philosophy ,  and was referred to by Roman philosopher Cicero. It was subsequently alluded to in the Bible ,  and then developed in the Middle Ages by Catholic philosophers such as Albert the Great and his pupil Thomas Aquinas.
John Locke. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions… and when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has  done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.